Re: next steps with CII -- back to [crypto_certificate_verification]:

Tony Hansen
 

Thank you, Natacha, for your comments. I also listened to the conversation on this week’s SECCOM meeting, which I unfortunately had to miss.

 

To summarize the concerns brought up:

  • The CII question is ambiguous and could be read as meaning that using SSL instead of TLS would lead to a N/A answer.
  • We really need to be mandating that projects use TLS in place of SSL.

 

I definitely can see how the question COULD be read that way, so agree that it is ambiguous.

 

The fun thing is that, when there are ambiguities, WE (the SECCOM) get to decide how to interpret it. So my proposal is:

 

  • If a remote site supports SSL, they are covered by this question.

 

(I’ve also filed a github ticket on the CII code about the ambiguity.)

 

Now I know that some of you are probably asking yourselves, but what about the other concern?

 

There are two aspects to the concern, though.

 

  1. We do not control >>remote sites<< that ONAP connects to, so cannot mandate anything about them. We can guarantee that we do certificate verification even when the remote end only does SSL, and we can try to put pressure on them to upgrade. But we don’t control much more.

 

  1. We CAN do things with our own software. For these, though, I think they are adequately covered by other CII issues. In particular:

 

crypto_tls12

The software produced by the project SHOULD/MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

crypto_used_network

The software produced by the project SHOULD/MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network comunications, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

Both of these are SHOULD questions at the Silver level, and MUST questions at the Gold level.

 

Do we think that these are worth focusing on next? Since they keep coming up, I think this should be the order of the next 6 weeks’ worth of focus topics.

 

CII Badging Focus Topics order

  1. crypto_certificate_verification

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

  1. crypto_used_network

The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network comunications, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

  1. crypto_tls12

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

  1. crypto_credential_agility

The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replacement them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

  1. crypto_verification_private

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

I’ll post updated slides shortly with the ambiguity dealt with.

 

                Tony

 

From: "natacha.mach@..." <natacha.mach@...>
Date: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:42 AM
To: "HANSEN, TONY L" <tony@...>, "GATHMAN, JONATHAN C" <jonathan.gathman@...>, "onap-seccom@..." <onap-seccom@...>
Cc: PAWLAK Pawel O-PL <pawel.pawlak3@...>, "ZWARICO, AMY" <az9121@...>, "CLOSE, PIERRE" <pierre.close@...>
Subject: RE:[Onap-seccom] next steps with CII -- focus on crypto_credential_agility

 

Hello,

 

Many thanks for your answer.

 

Regarding the following statement: 

"The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A)."

 

==> the "not applicable", in my understanding / opinion should not be possible.

TLS should be mandatory, with no other option. If TLS is not possible then the solution is not comptible and the statement unmet.

 

What do you think?

 

best regards

Natacha

 


De : HANSEN, TONY L [tony@...]
Envoyé : jeudi 20 juin 2019 14:27
À : MACH Natacha TGI/OLS; GATHMAN, JONATHAN C; onap-seccom@...
Cc : PAWLAK Pawel O-PL; ZWARICO, AMY; CLOSE, PIERRE
Objet : Re: [Onap-seccom] next steps with CII -- focus on crypto_credential_agility

Thank you for your email, Natacha.

 

These are both very important considerations, and they are covered under other CII topics:

 

The comment about hashing passwords is covered under the CII topic [crypto_password_storage]:

 

If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2, Bcrypt or Scrypt).

 

The comment about TLS certification verification is covered under the CII topic [crypto_certificate_verification]:

 

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

There is another thread on the [onap-seccom] mailing list that is focusing on the [crypto_certificate_verification] CII topic. Please take a look there and make sure that your concerns regarding certification verification are being sufficiently addressed.

 

Thank you again for your email, Natacha.

 

                Tony

 

From: "natacha.mach@..." <natacha.mach@...>
Date: Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 5:41 AM
To: "HANSEN, TONY L" <tony@...>, "GATHMAN, JONATHAN C" <jonathan.gathman@...>, "onap-seccom@..." <onap-seccom@...>
Cc: PAWLAK Pawel O-PL <pawel.pawlak3@...>, "ZWARICO, AMY" <az9121@...>, "CLOSE, PIERRE" <pierre.close@...>
Subject: RE:[Onap-seccom] next steps with CII -- focus on crypto_credential_agility

 

Hello 

 

Thanks for these informations.

 

i have 2 comments / questions:

- The storage of password must be hashed.

- regarding the following statement:

If your project software uses TLS, but its default mode is NOT to do certificate verification against a locally maintained list of Certificate Authority certificates.

  • Click [Unmet]
  • FILE A JIRA against your project
  • In the description, explain what you don’t do
  • Include the current date at the end of your explanation, as in [2019/06/24]
  • Include a URL to your project’s onap.readthedocs.io page that describes how it uses external APIs.
  • Include the JIRA ticket number(s) in your answer.

 

==> is TLS is available, the certificate verification should be mandatory.

 

What do you think?

 

Regards

Natacha

 

 

 

 

 


De : onap-seccom@... [onap-seccom@...] de la part de Tony Hansen [tony@...]
Envoyé : jeudi 20 juin 2019 05:34
À : GATHMAN, JONATHAN C; onap-seccom@...
Cc : PAWLAK Pawel O-PL; ZWARICO, AMY; CLOSE, PIERRE
Objet : Re: [Onap-seccom] next steps with CII -- focus on crypto_credential_agility

This message focuses on [crypto_credential_agility].

 

Reminder about the CII text:

 

[crypto_credential_agility]

The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replacement them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

My take is that this one covers both the credentials needed to access remote services by the application AND the credentials used for authentication of others connecting to the application.

 

  1. Correct, no hard coding of passwords within the source code.
  2. Good questions on containers. I’m not sure what the answers are.
    1. Kubernetes secrets would probably satisfy the requirement.
  1. It seems that AAF would be a perfectly reasonable way to satisfy this requirement.

 

One aspect is that if you have passwords (or hashes of the passwords, etc), should be saved in the a different file from where other configuration values are stored.

 

Additional discussion is welcome.

 

                Tony

 

From: "GATHMAN, JONATHAN C" <jonathan.gathman@...>
Date: Wednesday, June 19, 2019 at 6:45 AM
To: "HANSEN, TONY L" <tony@...>, "onap-seccom@..." <onap-seccom@...>
Cc: Pawlak Paweł 3 - Korpo <pawel.pawlak3@...>, "ZWARICO, AMY" <az9121@...>, "CLOSE, PIERRE" <pierre.close@...>
Subject: Re: next steps with CII

 

Question(s), Tony,

 

. . .

 

Agility

1.      Are you talking about storing Credentials, etc, of the App itself, or Clients

a.      By “Compile” are you talking about not Hard Coding Passwords in Source (i.e. .js, java, .c, .cpp, whatever) files.

b.      Or are we realizing that Containers essentially Freeze what used to be dynamic configs, so you have to plan for updates.

                                                      i.      Does “Use docker/kubectl Container Copy instructions” meet this goal?

                                                    ii.      The constant Top priority of “Start from Scratch” makes this difficult, of course.

c.       If Client Creds, it should be pointed out that Apps can use Externalization of Client Creds, which is, of course, the point of AAF (sorry for the plug)

 

. . .

     

 

-- 

Jonathan Gathman

Principled-System Architect

ATO Tech Dev/SEAT/Platform Architecture and Technology Management

 

AT&T Services, Inc.

m  314-550-3312  |  jonathan.gathman@...

 

 

From: "HANSEN, TONY L" <tony@...>
Date: Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 11:49 AM
To: "onap-seccom@..." <onap-seccom@...>
Cc: Pawlak Paweł 3 - Korpo <pawel.pawlak3@...>, "ZWARICO, AMY" <az9121@...>, "CLOSE, PIERRE" <pierre.close@...>, "GATHMAN, JONATHAN C" <jonathan.gathman@...>
Subject: next steps with CII

 

Here are the next few items that I think we need to work on with respect to moving forward with CII badging. These three have lots of projects marked [?] under the Silver level.

 

[crypto_certificate_verification]

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

[crypto_credential_agility]

The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replacement them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

[crypto_verification_private]

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

 

As discussed at DDF, the idea is that we would

 

Week 1

Introduce a topic at the PTL meeting with instructions.

We give stats on how many projects that have answered this question already.

Week 2

One week later, we check to see what progress there is.

Give kudos to those who have made progress.

We file JIRA tickets on those projects that have not given any answer.

Introduce the next topic, etc

Week 3

We bump up the priority on those tickets.

 

So, for next week’s meeting, here are instructions for [crypto certificate verification]. Comments are welcome.

 

  • This week’s CII issue is

[crypto_certificate_verification]

The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select 'not applicable' (N/A).

  • Visit your project page, and login. (If necessary, go to bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org and do a search.)
  • Click on the silver button near the top where it says “You can also view your [silver] or [gold] level criteria.”
  • Click the [Edit] button at the top.
  • Scroll to the bottom and click on the v Security banner. Search for “The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS”
  • This question is about places in your software where you invoke external APIs, such as HTTP REST calls or database queries or LDAP.
    • If your project software does not make any external API calls, then select “not applicable”
      • Click the [N/A] button
      • In the description, explain that you do not have any external API calls.
      • Include the current date at the end of your explanation, as in [2019/06/24]
      • Include a URL to your project’s onap.readthedocs.io page that describes its architecture.
    • If your project software does NOT use TLS for ANY of your external API calls, then select “not applicable”.
      • Click the [N/A] button
      • In the description, explain that you do not have any external API calls.
      • Include the current date at the end of your explanation, as in [2019/06/24]
      • Include a URL to your project’s onap.readthedocs.io page that describes how it uses external APIs.
    • If your project software uses TLS, and its default mode is to do certification verification against a locally maintained list of Certificate Authority certificates.
      • Click [Met]
      • In the description, explain that you do not have any external API calls.
      • Include the current date at the end of your explanation, as in [2019/06/24]
      • Include a URL to your project’s onap.readthedocs.io page that describes how it uses external APIs.
    • If your project software uses TLS, but its default mode is NOT to do certificate verification against a locally maintained list of Certificate Authority certificates.
      • Click [Unmet]
      • FILE A JIRA against your project
      • In the description, explain what you don’t do
      • Include the current date at the end of your explanation, as in [2019/06/24]
      • Include a URL to your project’s onap.readthedocs.io page that describes how it uses external APIs.
      • Include the JIRA ticket number(s) in your answer.
    • If some of your software meets the above but other parts do not:
      • Select [Unmet]
      • Include an explanation in the description for each part, following the above instructions.
    • If some of your software meets the above, but other parts do not use TLS,
      • Select [Met]
      • Include an explanation in the description for each part, following the aboe instructions.
  • VERY IMPORTANT: Click one of the green buttons that say [Save (and exit)] or [Save (and continue)]

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a l'expediteur et le detruire ainsi que les pieces jointes. Les messages electroniques etant susceptibles d'alteration,
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